The guys at Soldier X have a tutorial on running the famous Geek Squad MRI (internal tools for Geek Squad only) from USB http://www.soldierx.com/bbs/Small-Tutorial.

Over the past year, HardenedBSD has been hard at work in integrating the Cross-DSO CFI implementation in llvm. We have reached a point where we can release an early (pre-alpha) public Call For Testing (CFT) of this work. For reasons which will be described below, we recommend this CFT be used by those using root-on-ZFS with boot environments. We recommend testing in a dedicated boot environment. This initial round of testing is best suited for development server installations.

Production servers and desktops/laptops are not advised for testing at this time. We're looking for feedback on what works and doesn't work.

Introduction Control Flow Integrity, or CFI, is an exploit mitigation that aims to make it harder for an attacker to hijack the control flow of an executable image. Llvm's CFI implementation provides forward-edge protection, meaning it protects call sites and non-return code branches.

Llvm includes basic and incomplete backward-edge protection via SafeStack. CFI in llvm consists of two flavors: 1. Non-Cross-DSO CFI 2. Cross-DSO CFI For over a year now, HardenedBSD has adopted non-Cross-DSO CFI in 12-CURRENT/amd64. Support for non-Cross-DSO CFI was added for 12-CURRENT/arm64 on 01 July 2018. Non-Cross-DSO CFI applies CFI to the applications themselves, but not on the shared objects they depend on.

Cross-DSO CFI applies CFI to both applications and shared objects, enforcing CFI across shared object boundaries. When an application or shared object is compiled, its source files typically get compiled first to intermediate object files. Enabling Cross-DSO CFI requires compiling and linking both static and shared libraries with Link Time Optimization (LTO). When LTO is enabled, these object files are no longer ELF object files, but rather LLVM IR bitcode object files. As usual, many of the crew members of soldierx.com will be at Defcon 26. Blake has also informed me that the chat software (for anonymous conversations) that is heavily used by folks at Defcon is feature complete.

There's more information about this at. I would like to point out that the Mojave Phone Booth is in no way ran by soldierx.com despite some of the rumors online. The only relationship is that one of our crew members, Blake, wrote the software that powers the SMS and Signal portions of it. If you want to join it, please send SUBSCRIBE to 760-733-9969 via SMS or Signal. Should be replaced with your desired alias.

If you're going to Defcon 26 and you'd like to meet up with members of soldierx.com, please. You can also track us down in and get more information that way. We look forward to seeing new and old faces in the desert this year.

Yesterday afternoon, children at a mall in Ohio where shocked to find that instead of the Easter Bunny - they found a man dressed as the pickle from the now infamous Pickle Surprise video (directed by Tom Rubnitz) was waiting for them. For a ten minute period, the individual, who has since been identified as Durandal, did nothing but yell 'Pickle Surprise' and 'HAI2U' at the children.

He was also offering 'free candy' before he fled the facility once mall security arrived. When asked about the incident, mall-goer Chad Newsom stated that, 'I had no clue what was going on and thought it had something to do with Adult Swim.' Currently, no charges are planned on being filed as despite the disturbing event that took place, no children were abducted thanks to mall security. A photo was captured of Durandal in his getup, which can be seen below: If you happen to see him in your area, please contact the local authorities. Rise of nations full download.

My Thotcon presentation has been accepted! Below is the presentation abstract: Without exploit mitigations and with an insecure-by-default design, writing malware for FreeBSD is a fun task, taking us back to 1999-era Linux exploit authorship. Several members of FreeBSD's development team have claimed that Capsicum, a capabilities/sandboxing framework, prevents exploitation of applications.